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Abstract—Data with high security requirements is being 
processed and stored with increasing frequency in the Cloud. To 
guarantee that the data is being dealt in a secure manner we 
investigate the applicability of Assurance methodologies. In a 
typical Cloud environment the setup of multiple layers and 
different stakeholders determines security properties of 
individual components that are used to compose Cloud 
applications. We present a methodology adapted from Common 
Criteria for aggregating information reflecting the security 
properties of individual constituent components of Cloud 
applications.  This aggregated information is used to categorise 
overall application security in terms of Assurance Levels and to 
provide a continuous assurance level evaluation. It gives the 
service owner an overview of the security of his service, without 
requiring detailed manual analyses of log files.  
Keywords — critical infrastructures, assurance, cloud  
I. INTRODUCTION  
An important transformation process in IT systems is 
currently taking place triggered by the rapid propagation of the 
Cloud Computing paradigm across distinct domains and 
organisations. Hence it is envisaged that ICT services will in 
future be delivered in a manner similar to utilities such as 
water, electricity, gas, and telephony. The main motivation for 
adopting Cloud technology is to increase efficiency and 
minimize IT costs by offering new concepts such as elasticity, 
scalability and on-demand resource provisioning. However, in 
order to automatically provision resources for elastically 
adaptive Cloud applications it requires both, the applications 
and the underlying platform to be constantly monitored to 
capture information at various system and operational levels 
and time intervals. This is particularly manifested in Critical 
Infrastructures, which require even more attention when these 
systems are hosted on top of Cloud environments.  
However, the use of Cloud computing has introduced new 
risks that have to be sufficiently understood before an 
organisation should consider adopting the Cloud and using 
Cloud services. Moreover, due to the complexity of the 
application execution environment, routine tasks such as 
monitoring or security analysis becomes quite complex. These 
tasks often require close interaction and assessment between 
different layers of the Cloud stack. For example, certain 
distributed applications running within a Cloud cluster on 
specific virtual machine(s) (VM) require a general assurance, 
or even have to be certified, for maintaining specific security 
properties. This might also require monitoring the execution of 
the application on the VMs, as well as monitoring the 
availability of the physical resources of the VMs. Thus, this 
would require the use of different tool sets to collect and 
analyse the performance of data from each level in order to 
reach the point where the application can be certified.  
Under these circumstances, we should gather different 
types of information at various levels of granularity, from low-
level system metrics (e.g. CPU usage, network traffic, memory 
allocation, etc.) to high-level application specific metrics (e.g. 
throughput, latency, availability, etc.). These are collected 
across multiple system layers (physical, virtualization, 
application level) in a Cloud environment at different time 
intervals. Hence, the challenge in this case is to define a way to 
aggregate these different types of information from different 
levels in order to provide an overall assurance, and determine 
how changes in individual assurance levels of every 
component affects the overall assurance.  
In this paper, we propose, based on existing work[10] an 
assurance method. We refer to assurance, motivated by 
common criteria, as the likelihood for a service falling victim 
to a cyber-attack. A high assurance level means a low 
probability for this to happen. Security properties, based on 
measurable metrics, of substituent components contribute to 
the overall assurance level and how they are aggregated is 
subject to dependency policies. This is based on a 
comprehensive concept for assessing security properties across 
multiple layers with different stakeholders for composite based 
systems. The dependency policies, can be flexibly adopted 
according to various use case requirements to derive evaluation 
of every individual component of a service or a system.    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
outlines the related work. Section III describes our approach 
and introduces the Assurance Assessment Method, the way we 
define assurance levels, how we abstract the service as a 
general tree, and the assurance aggregation process. In Section 
IV the evaluation of the approach is provided based on a Use 
Case Scenario. Finally, section V provides concluding remarks 
and directions for future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Traditional approaches for assurance assessment in the 
Cloud, such as Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [12], 
Information Technology Assurance Framework (ITAF) [17], 
or the Cloud Computing Information Assurance Framework 
from ENISA [18], are usually built on existing frameworks 
such as ISO/IEC 27000-series (e.g. current work in progress 
ISO/IEC 27017 and ISO/IEC 27018 which are focusing on 
  
information security and data protection in Cloud), PCI DSS 
Cloud Guideline [13], COBIT [14], NIST [16], or IT Baseline 
Protection Catalogues [15]. 
We have considered existing approaches, namely the 
Common Criteria framework [6] for assurance of IT systems 
(as it is the most dominant work in the field) and extends it 
[10] since its main focus is on assessing assurance in the 
development phase of the life cycle but lacks support in the 
subsequent production phase.   
 Unlike traditional approaches, the work derived from 
Krotsiani et.al. [11] proposes a novel approach for certifying 
the security of Cloud services based on incremental 
certification of security properties for different types of Cloud 
services (including IaaS, PaaS and SaaS services). This 
approach uses operational evidence from the services 
provisioning through continuous monitoring. Although the 
model does not directly address assurance as an explicit 
objective, it can be adopted to efficiently assess assurance at 
various levels and time intervals. 
Our approach is related to autonomic monitoring systems 
that are based on the SECCRIT architecture model [7] and on 
an evidence-gathering model for assurance assessment in 
critical infrastructures hosted on top of Cloud environments (as 
introduced in [8]). Moreover, we found the concepts of 
Common Criteria for analysing and assessing application in 
preproduction phases. However, we emphasize the importance 
of observing systems in their production phase, as well as their 
dependencies with other corresponding elements inside of 
heterogeneous systems1 
III. MULTI LAYER ASSURANCE ASSESMENT MODEL 
. The popular National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) [3] model depicts the Cloud architecture 
through a dynamic tree-layered service-provisioning model 
(infrastructure, platform and software - as a Service layer) 
capable of scaling services across distinct administrative and 
legislative domains. However, the common practices for 
provisioning and delivering services (as well as the abstraction 
of those layers and driven technologies) differentiates based on 
the business objectives of a particular Cloud provider. Hence, 
the traditional assessment frameworks (e.g. COBIT, ISO 
27000 series) are not fully applicable, especially when 
addressing security related concerns in Cloud environments (as 
discussed in [10]).   
However, in order to build a comprehensive and flexible 
framework that is able to acquire heterogeneous information 
across the Cloud stack the following objectives have to be 
addressed:  cross layer assessment   technology independence  information acquisition restrictions  assessment, quantification and aggregation of 
different information sets 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that our work is a part of a broader research programme, 
undertaken by the EU F7 project SECCRIT [4] 
The assessment of such services when taking into account 
different Cloud layers requires a compact solution, able to 
embrace all requirements and produce an effective assessment 
tool. Especially when considering different stakeholders, 
various business and security objectives, a high degree of 
service complexity, business model, and distinct technologies. 
Hence, we adopt Common Criteria [6] to address assurance in 
Cloud related environments. Although, Common Criteria 
offers a comprehensive solution for assurance assessment, it 
lacks support for the production phase, especially when 
referring to those services that are hosted on top of the Cloud 
architectures. Taking this and the above-mentioned objectives 
into account, we use the Common Criteria approach in order to 
address assurance assessment of complex services hosted in 
Cloud infrastructures. Furthermore, the policies of some Cloud 
providers restrict information crawling across their Cloud stack 
(for instance software as a service Cloud provider will hesitate 
to reveal the information of underlying service being provided, 
in order to mitigate potential attack vectors on its 
infrastructure). Hence it is harder to analyse, indicate or predict 
security issues in such environments. Thus, we distinguish two 
main categories: a) solutions based on open-source Cloud 
environments (i.e. solutions where we are able to freely acquire 
necessary information without restrictions); and b) closed 
Cloud environments with restricted information access (i.e. 
public Cloud providers which provide any additional 
information via the Service Level Agreements (SLA) 
[21][22]). Due to the flexibility of acquiring the information 
and ability to modify services for provisioning the information, 
this paper focuses primarily on open-source Cloud solutions 
(e.g. OpenStack [23], CloudStack [24]). This does, however, 
not limit our approach to these environments. 
The assessment and aggregation of different information 
sets (i.e. analysis of a particular entity in the Cloud with 
respect to a specific set of properties) is derived from the 
concept of assurance levels, supported through aggregation 
policies (i.e. decision making algorithms that cluster the 
security properties of each class towards the predefined 
assurance levels), aligned with the Common Criteria approach 
[6].  
A.  Assurance assesment method  
Considering these objectives and building on the research 
presented in [10] we propose a comprehensive and flexible 
approach for performing assurance assessment. The approach 
is using a well-defined set of security properties, provided by 
the CUMULUS project [5]. These are additionally aligned with 
the SECCRIT vulnerability catalogue [20] and The Notorious 
Nine from Cloud Security Alliance [19]. 
 Our assessment method emphasises three core assessment 
entities: Target of Evaluation (ToE), Group of Evaluation 
(GoE) and Component of Evaluation (CoE). These entities are 
aligned with the Common Criteria assessment framework, and 
are therefore designed to offer flexibility, determination of the 
precise impact of the individual components or group of 
components, scalability of assessment across different time 
  
intervals, and the possibility to highlight each individual entity 
of the system as an independent point of evaluation.  
Furthermore, we designed our method as a hierarchical tree 
structure defined with parent-child object relationship. Each 
parent can be in a direct relationship with multiple child 
objects. The parent object that does not have any related child 
objects is referred to as leaf object. Additionally, we also 
define associations, dependencies, associated component sets 
and assurance profiles, as supporting assessment elements of 
the ToE. Figure 1 illustrates the fundamental elements of our 
Assurance Assessment Method. More specifically, it presents 
how a particular service can be abstracted through a set of 
hierarchically organized components. We use these abstraction 
elements to build our method and to efficiently assess 
assurance according to a predefined set of security properties 
derived from the CUMULUS project.  
The initial step of the assessment method defines and 
details the ToE. This can be either an asset of the Cloud 
referred to as service (e.g. a specific service operation, a set of 
service operations, data managed by the service) or an asset 
that is required or contributes to the realization of a Cloud 
service (e.g., a virtual machine).  
Moreover, each ToE contains a set of attributes such as: (i) 
security objectives, which are mapped towards the related set 
of security claims and are formally referred to as Security 
Properties (SP); (ii) attributes that define the type of assurance 
(e.g. information or system assurance) according to the 
assurance model presented in [10]; (iii) a short description of 
the ToE; and (iv) the assessment interval. The security 
objectives are the statements of intent to counter the identified 
threats by IT measures. Each ToE can be formally defined as 
ToE ≡ T = {COEi, i ∈ N} | {GOEi, i ∈ N}. This generalized 
statement as presented in Figure 1 can be formulated as ToE ≡ 
COEA = {COEi, i ∈ ۃB, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, Jۄ}. The group of 
objects, formally referred as Group of Evaluation (GoE) and 
defined as GoE = {CoEi, i ∈ N}, are a compound set of 
individual objects that share common properties based on 
which the assessment is conducted. Considering Figure 1, GoE 
can be formulated as compound of objects, e.g. GOE1 = 
{COEi, i ∈ ۃF, H, I, Jۄ}. Each individual object to which we 
refer to as the component of evaluation (CoE) can be also 
handled as an independent ToE. Each GoE is composed of (i) 
attributes, used for describing a particular group; (ii) assurance 
profile, which is the essential element for evaluation; (iii) 
associations, an element used to describe relationships between 
different groups in the scope of the evaluated target; and (iv) 
individual components. 
Component Dependency (CD) is a correlation between two 
individual components of the evaluated system (i.e where CDij 
{ۃCOEi , COEjۄ, i, j ∈N}), that arises when a component is not 
self-sufficient and relies upon the presence of another 
component, e.g. when referring to Figure 1 CDCG={COEC, 
COEG}. Association is a set of two individual components that 
are in a direct parent-child relationship with a defined 
dependency, for which it is valid: ∀ ASi i ∈ N ≡ !׌ CDij { ۃCOEi , COEjۄ, i, j ∈N} ⟹ COEi  parent of COEj. An 
individual parent object can be associated with N distinct child 
objects, which we formally refer to as Associated Component 
Set (ACS), for which the following statements are valid: ACSK ≔ ACS (COEK) = {COEi, i ∈ N}, ∀ COEi ⟹ !׌ Parent = 
COEK and ׍ CDij {ۃCOEi , COEjۄ, i, j ∈ N}.  
Last but not least, the Assurance profile (AP), an essential 
element in our method used to define policy related with 
security properties that are mapped to the Assurance classes 
(AC) of a particular CoE or GoE. These security properties 
will at the end define the level of assurance for an individual 
component, group or even a whole system. We emphasize two 
types of Assurance profiles setup: Uniform Assurance Profile 
(APU), which is always the same regardless of class, evaluated 
object, group or target; and Custom Assurance Profile (APP), 
which can be customised depending on the object of appliance.  
In Table 1 we illustrated the APU for a particular assurance 
class. Furthermore, we can also assign a custom Assurance 
Profile to a particular CoE, GoE or ToE.    
B. Assurance Levels  
 Assurance levels (AL) outline the scale of measurement 
for evaluating predefined ToE, GoE or CoE. Every individual 
CoE or GoE contributes directly to the assurance level of the 
ToE by meeting a set of SPs (i.e. a certain set of security 
criteria). Moreover, the SPs derive the AL per individual AC 
by also taking into consideration the dependencies of the 
evaluated object, e.g. component, group or target of evaluation 
if such are present. However, each AC may contain k of SP (k 
number of SPs) as shown in equations (5) and (6). Due to the 
binary decision making concept applied in our approach there 
can be 2k combinations of distinct SP states where 2k > N, and 
N is the cardinality of AL, in terms of security properties (AL= 
Figure 1: Hierarchical illustration of services via the general tree model 
structure.  The service or application is defined as a Target of Evaluation (ToE) 
depicted with the individual Components of Evaluation (CoE), whereby each 
individual CoE can be associated with N distinct CoEs, referred as Associated 
Component Set (ACS). The correlation between two individual CoEs is 
referred to as a Component Dependency, which is a formal compound of 
Association. Moreover, CoEs are grouped in order to establish assurance of 
components with respect to specifc security classes, these groups are then 
formally defined as Groups of Evaluation (GoE). 
 
  
{1, 2, 3, 4 … N}). Thus, each individual combinations of SPs 
{SP1, SP 2, SP3, SP4 … SPN}, associated with a particular AC, 
are formally referred to as Security Property Vector (SPV) 
(equations (3, (4, (5, (6). Security Property Vector defines the 
current state of an object by identifying particular set of 
security properties. Each SPV, is associated with a particular 
assurance class, whereby each class can comprise multiple 
SPVs. Thus, in order to scale 2k states over N assurance levels, 
we encode ranges in hexadecimal vectors that cluster a 
potential set of states that correspond to a particular SPV, as 
shown in Table 1. Hence, each individual AL is assigned with 
multiple SPVs, which are formally referred as Vector Set (VS), 
(equation (2)).  
Table 1 presents an example of Assurance profile for a 
particular Assurance class. More specifically, it illustrates a set 
of relevant SPs clustered per individual ACK represented with 
a hexadecimal vector. The left hand side of the table shows the 
SPVs, sorted by relevance, and all potential combinations for a 
particular security vector SPV = [SP4, SP3, SP2, SP1]. The right 
hand side shows a binary vector for ALi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3 … 7}), 
which associates particular set of SV vectors. At the bottom of 
the table the Hexadecimal representation of each particular 
binary AL vector is illustrated.  
Table 1 Assurance level association for a particular assurance class. Set of 
relevant SPVs clustered per individual ACK represented with a hexadecimal 
vector. The left hand side of the table shows the SPVs, sorted per relevance, 
and all potential appearance combinations for a particular  vector SPV = [SP4, 
SP3, SP2, SP1]. The right hand side shows a binary vector for ALi, i ∈ {1, … 
7}, which associates particular set of SV vectors. At the bottom of the table the 
Hexadecimal representation of each particular binary AL vector is illustrated. 
 
Security 
Property Vector 
(SPV) 
Assurance level association 
SP4 SP3 SP2 SP1 AL AL1 AL2 AL3 AL4 AL5 AL6 AL7 
0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 AL1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 AL2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 AL2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 AL3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 AL3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 AL4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 AL4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 AL5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 AL5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 AL6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 AL6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 AL7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 AL7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 0 AL7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 AL7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hexadecimal AL vector 0002 000C 0030 00C0 0300 0C00 7000 
 
 
For each individual AC that is associated with a set of 
SPVs particular SP (part of SPV) may vary. Nevertheless, 
every individual AC, regardless of the SPs, always has to have 
the same cardinality k (equation (5)). In order to efficiently 
aggregate the assurance across the variety of architectural 
layers, ACs first has to fulfil the equations (5) and (6), stating 
that regardless of the AC, none of the SPs can be associated 
with more than one AC (equation (7)).  
 Although, we abstract ALs over N levels, for the purpose 
of our empirical evaluation we will conduct the assessment 
over 7 ALs, therefore having minimum 3 SP per AC to be able 
to map all assurance levels with SPVs. Depending on the 
property set that a particular entity (i.e. class component, group 
or even a whole target of evaluation) is assigned with and due 
to the dynamic behaviour of the Cloud the AL will also be 
dynamic and vary. Hence, it is crucial to efficiently assess the 
assurance in a continuous manner without impacting on the 
performance of the evaluated service or collocated services.  
C. Assurance Aggregation 
As mentioned above, we propose a concept for the 
assurance aggregation through a recursive process, which 
aggregates the individual assurance levels of the underlying 
associated objects (i.e. it calculates the overall assurance of the 
components that are associated with the root component). The 
overall assurance can be derived by applying the method 
depicted in Figure 1. Further, by conducting the proposed 
algorithm described in Figure 4 we can then derive the overall 
assurance. Therefore by referring to Figure 1, we state the 
CoEA as the ToE. Since, the CoEA is associated with two 
additional components, CoEB and CoEC, which represent the 
associated components set (ACSA) of the CoEA and are 
additionally connected with other components. The overall 
assurance in this case has to be recursively aggregated from the 
leafs of the tree (i.e. by aggregating all ACS (ACSB, ACSC and 
ACSF). Therefore we will use tree traversal post order method 
to iteratively walk through the tree. For the first use case, we 
just refer to the concept of the tree traversal post order method 
as a tool for our concept. This method is slightly extended by 
integrating our Assurance Level Calculation Procedure 
(ALCP) from Figure 3 using recursively aggregate assurance. 
The assurance level of the referenced ACS (ACSF, ACSB 
and ACSC, respectively), by applying the ALCP aligned with 
the equation (8). The procedure sequentially conducts bitwise 
conjunction of individual SPs for each CoE across each ACS. 
Depending on the result of conjunction (1 or 0) it is decided if 
all SPVs are discarded with the bit that matches the result of 
the conjunction. For example, by discarding certain SPVs we 
are indirectly discarding those ALs that are not fulfilling the 
∀ALK ∈ ACX:  !׌ VS,   (1) 
VS = {SPV1, SPV2 … SPVN}, (2) 
SPVi= [ SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4], SPi =  {0,1} (3) ∀VS ∈  ALK :  ׌ SPVi, i ∈ℕ (4) ∀ SPVi ∈ ACX: |SPVi| = k (5) 
ACX= {SPV1, SPV2, SPV3, … SPVn} (6) ⋂            (7) 
ACSAL = ⍝ACX (SPVi) ,  ACX ∈ CoEM, i ∈ {1…N} (8) 
ACSAL(i) ⊢ DALVS(i) (9) 
ALVS ⊆  DALVS (10) 
 (DALVS(i) ∧ ALVS(i)) ⇒ AL(ACX)=i, ACX ∈ CoEM (11) 
!׌ ALi ⊧  ∀Min(CALj)  i∈ {1…7}, j∈ {1…N} (12) 
  
current set of SPs for particular ACS. The next step is to map 
the suitable ACSAL, according to the Table 2, towards the 
appropriate DALVS. The DALVS is not only used for mapping 
the calculated
 
ACSAL, but also to customize the underlying 
security properties of a particular AL. Finally, we calculate the 
AL of the root CoE for a particular ACS, equation (9), 
depending on the SPs that the CoE corresponds to the AL of 
the ACS whereby the equations (10) and  have to be fulfilled.  
However, in case of multiple ACs per CoE we have to consider 
equation (12) where we consider the AL of individual ACs to 
determine consolidated ALs for a CoE.  
Table 2: Assurance Level per distinct Assurance classes depicted with 
Hexadecimal vectors. We define minimal assurance level requirements 
(DALVS) of the objects that are in direct relationship with the parent object. It 
also defines the assurance level requirements per level of the parent object 
itself, ALVS. Additionally we define the minimum requirement for each AC in 
terms of AL, i.e. we define at which assurance level individual AC has to 
satisfy to define the overall assurance of the object. In case when we have 
multiple AC to consider in order to derive the overall AL we use the 
Consolidated Assurance Level (CAL). 
 
ASSURANCE LEVEL I II III IV V VI VII N 
AC1 
ALVS 0002 0008 0010 0080 0C00 7000 8000 8000 
DALVS 0002 0004 0030 00C0 0D00 3000 C000 8000 
CAL - AL1 AL2 AL3 AL5 AL6 AL7 ALN 
AC2 
ALVS 0002 0008 0020 0040 0300 1800 4000 8000 
DALVS 0004 0018 0020 00C0 0300 1C00 6000 8000 
CAL - AL1 AL3 AL4 AL5 AL6 AL7 ALN 
AC3 
ALVS 0002 000C 0010 00C0 0200 0C00 4000 8000 
DALVS 0006 0004 0030 01C0 0200 1C00 6000 8000 
CAL AL1 AL2 AL3 AL4 AL5 AL5 AL6 ALN 
ACN 
ALVS 0006 000C 0030 00C0 0D00 1C00 7000 8000 
DALVS 0006 000C 0030 00C0 0D00 1C00 7000 8000 
CAL AL1 AL2 AL3 AL4 AL5 AL5 AL7 ALN 
D. General Tree Model  
A general tree G is a finite compound set of nodes such that 
there is only one designated node R, referred as root of the tree 
G, where each individual node has only one ancestor (Parent) 
node, with exception of the root, and multiple successors 
(Children). Each node of the tree is defined by two properties: 
Depth and Degree. Depth of the node is the distance of the 
node from the root node, and Degree of the node is the number 
of successors for a particular node. Moreover, each general tree 
can be partitioned in n > 0 disjoint subsets T0, T1, T2 … Tn-1, 
where each is a tree whose roots R0, R1, R2 … Rn-1 are children 
of the tree G. The subset Ti (0 ≤ i ≥ n) is a subset of the trees 
of T.  
Although we intent to depict our services through a general 
based tree model, they can be also depicted via the binary tree 
model, since the general tree model is easily transformed to A 
binary tree. For demonstrational purpose of our algorithm 
(Figure 3) we will use the general tree model. Since the model 
can be easily transformed, our implementation can be adopted 
to apply the algorithm on binary trees as well. However, we 
will not address the assessment of binary trees as it exceeds the 
scope of this work.  
IV. EVALUATION 
The introduced approach is evaluated and explained in 
more details using two scenarios. As first step, the cyber-risks 
that exist in the use case scenario have to be understood 
alongside the security properties that need to be assessed and 
certified.  
Perceptions of risk in the context of Cloud computing have 
to be well understood since they will inevitably influence 
decisions about the adoption of Clouds or the security controls 
that will be applied to them. Two important factors that must 
be taken into consideration for a better understanding of cyber-
security risks are: (i) the threats and their likelihood to occur; 
and (ii) the vulnerabilities and an indication of their severity. A 
key challenge when understanding the risks associated with 
Cloud computing is to determine those that are specific to the 
use of Clouds.  
Figure 2: Evaluation use cases derived with respect to the SECCRIT [4] case studies. The subfigure (a) illustrates the basic model of a general tree where the
depth of the tree is one and the degree is N. This is an initial model where the algorithm introduced in Figure 3calculates iteratively the conjunction of SPV bits
to determine the overall assurance of the leaves of ACS for CoEi, i ∈ {B,C,D…N} and aggregates towards root according the policies defined in Table 2 and 
equations (8, (9, (10, (11, (12).  Although this is straight forward, in subfigure (b), the same process is aligned with the post-order traversal method, 
which at the end aggregates the Assurance towards the root COEA. 
(a)                                                                                                              (b)  
  
Therefore, in order to comprehend the Cloud-specific risks 
of our scenario we use the Cloud vulnerability catalogue the 
SECCRIT project [4] has developed, in which we then mapped 
the Notorious Nine Top threats from CSA [1]. Further, with 
the help of the CUMULUS project’s security property 
catalogue [2], we map these vulnerabilities to possible security 
properties for their assessment. The basis of this catalogue is 
the identification of a number of categories that enable us to 
focus directly on Cloud-related issues. The core of these 
categories is based on the NIST essential Cloud computing 
characteristics [3].  
 
Figure 3: Assurance level calculation procedure (ALCP) for associated objects 
used in equation (8). The procedure does the bitwise conjunction of the most 
significant bit and based on the result decides whether to discard the SPV that 
have 0 or 1 assigned to a particular bit that is being analysed. Furthermore, 
during each iteration, the procedure checks if the remaining vectors that define 
a particular component are a subset of one of the vector sets associated to a 
particular ALi, as shown in Table 1, for a particular ACk 
A. Use Caseses  
The aim of the evaluation is to illustrate a real world 
scenario via the abstraction of a general tree model. This is 
used to assure the public safety of critical infrastructure 
services and assesses the assurance according to a set of 
security classes/properties. We refer in particular to the case 
studies from the SECCRIT project [4] in order to abstract our 
approach and make a proof of concept assessment algorithm.   
To demonstrate our algorithm we abstract a service via the 
use case scenarios explained below. Moreover, we 
implemented our assurance algorithm in Java so we can 
randomly define properties of evaluation such as depth of a 
tree, degree of a node, security property vector bit length. 
Furthermore, our implementation method is founded on post-
order tree traversal model in order to efficiently evaluate the 
assurance of service by traversing the tree to aggregate security 
in respect to assurance policies.  
For the first use case scenario, the Depth (D1) of the tree T1 
is 1, meaning that we have only a root with a set of children, 
Degree (D2) will be N, generated randomly, as shown in 
(Figure 2 (a)). In the second use case both degree and depth 
properties are predefined, e.g. D1=3 and D2=3 (Figure 2 (b)).  
Within the second use case we want to demonstrate the 
application of our algorithm in a more complex general tree, 
which would illustrate the service more realistically.   
B. Security Properties, Vulnerabilities and Threats 
The SECCRIT case studies consider mainly risks related to 
the authorisation of users, data storage and data leakage. In 
Figure 4 we present the architecture of the system with 
components in different levels, as well as their dependencies. 
Moreover, some relevant security properties are mapped to 
each component that needs to be certified in order to assure the 
whole service. 
 
 
Figure 4: Identified set of Security Properties across various architecture layers 
of the Cloud environment, mapped towards the SECCRIT vulnerability 
catalogue and CUMULUS property catalogue. Due to the fact that both 
catalogues enumerate large number of properties we only illustrated most 
representative ones for time being and will provide more detailed catalogue in 
our further work. 
Table 3 presents a number of security properties that are 
relevant for the case study, their security property category, as 
well as the vulnerabilities and threats that are related to each of 
them. Moreover, the dependencies between these properties are 
also provided according to Figure 4. From this list we have 
selected four properties, e.g. SP_7, SP_4, SP_6 and SP_1 to 
proceed to the evaluation of our approach, as a starting point of 
our on-going research on multi-layer assurance dependencies 
policies. 
C. Scenario based assessment 
To demonstrate the approach we distinguish two specific 
use cases: the fundamental general tree model (illustrated in 
Figure 2- a) and the advanced tree model (illustrated in Figure 
2- b).  Both models illustrate a service through a general tree 
model, where each individual node represents a standalone 
entity of the particular service that is being evaluated. 
Furthermore, we use our set of identified security properties to 
demonstrate our approach by distinguishing the four most 
relevant properties SP_7, SP_4, SP_6 and SP_1 assigning them 
as SP4, SP3, SP2 and SP1 respectively. We implemented a 
begin procedure:  
for i=k … i=ɨ do  
if (∀ CoEC (SPV[i]) ׌! ALM, M ∈ {ɨ,ɩ,…,7}) { 
AL = M; 
end procedure 
} 
else if (∏ Co  ሺ   [i]ሻ          ) { 
discard ∀ SPV where SPV[i] =1; 
continue; 
} 
else (∏ Co  ሺ   [i]ሻ          ) { 
discard ∀ SPV where SPV[i] =0; 
continue; 
} 
end procedure 
 
  
random bit vector generator that generates four bit sets, 
regardless of the use case, and associates them with individual 
SPV for a particular object. 
For the evaluation of our first use case scenario we 
illustrate a general tree model for each COEi, i ∈ {B, C, D…N} generated SPV [SP4, SP3, SP2, SP1], as shown in Table 
4 (a). We use the traversal post order method to recursively 
assess the use case scenarios. 
 
Table 3: Security Properties, Vulnerabilities & Threats 
ID 
Security 
Property 
Category Vulnerability Threats Depen
dencies 
SP_1 
User 
Authenticatio
n and Identity 
assurance 
level 
Identity 
Assurance 
Loss of human-
operated control point 
to verify security and 
privacy settings 
Data Breaches          
Data Loss             
Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities 
None 
Insufficient 
authentication security, 
e.g., weak 
authentication 
mechanisms, on the 
Cloud management 
interface 
Account or Service 
Traffic Hijacking       
Insecure Interfaces 
and APIs              
Malicious Insiders 
SP_2 
Data deletion 
quality level  
Data Disposal  Data recovery 
vulnerabilities, e.g., 
unauthorised access to 
data in memory or on 
disk from previous 
users 
Data Breaches 
Account or Service 
Traffic Hijacking 
Insecure Interfaces 
and APIs 
Malicious Insiders 
Insufficient Due 
Diligence 
None 
SP_3 
Storage 
Freshness 
Durability 
SP_4 
Data 
alteration 
prevention / 
detection 
Integrity Poor/ no integrity 
checks of the billing 
information 
Data Breaches 
Insecure Interfaces 
and APIs              
Insufficient Due 
Diligence 
SP_1, 
SP_2, 
SP_3 
SP_5 
Storage 
Retrievability  
Durability Poor/ no backup & 
restore strategy is in 
place to prevent the loss 
of billing information, 
e.g., in the case of a 
system failure 
Data Breaches 
Insecure Interfaces 
and APIs              
Insufficient Due 
Diligence 
SP_4 
SP_6 
Data leakage 
detection / 
prevention  
Data Leakage  Poor/ no encryption of 
the VM data through a 
wide-area migration 
process 
Data Breaches 
Malicious Insiders 
Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities 
SP_5 
SP_7 
Cryptographi
c module 
protection 
level 
Key 
Management 
Unmonitored and 
unencrypted network 
traffic between VMs is 
possible, e.g., for VMs 
on the same node 
through virtual network     
Unencrypted physical 
storage, which is the 
underlying for allocated 
virtual storage of the 
VMs 
Insufficient Due 
Diligence 
Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities         
Data Breaches          
Malicious Insiders None 
SP_8 Percentage of Up Time Availability 
Poor/ no implemented 
QoS (Quality of 
Service) services, e.g., 
to guarantee connection 
bandwidth required by 
the Cloud user.            
Only one ISP 
connection is 
considered for 
operation 
Insufficient Due 
Diligence 
Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities 
SP_6 
 
Poor/ no failover 
mechanism, e.g., in 
case of losing one out 
of two ISP connections      
Missing redundant 
power connection leads 
to a higher risk of 
losing power 
Denial of Service 
 
Due to the simplicity of the first use case scenario the traversal 
post order method only determines the sequence of the 
evaluated objects, which is {B, C, D … N} since we have a 
one-level deep tree. Consolidating this with our procedural 
algorithm from Figure 3 we conduct bitwise conjunction. In 
particular we start by conducting the procedure illustrated in 
equation (8) and implemented in our algorithm in Figure 3 on 
the SP4. The result of this is 0. This indicates that according to 
Table 1 we discard all potential combination that fulfil SP4 
(upper eight combination 8-15) and reduce to 3-bit vector set 
for further evaluation. Our next sequential step, applies the 
same process on SP3 resulting also to 0, which also lead to the 
same outcome, but reducing it into 2-bit vector. The next 
iteration for the SP3 resulted to 1 that maps the remaining bit 
vector sets towards the assurance level two, therefore making 
the last bit irrelevant for the assurance since both potential 
outcomes (0 and 1) would lead towards assurance level two.  
Hence, the final vector, according to Table 1, associates the 
underlying Associated component set (ACS) of the root node 
with AL=2 is SPV = [001X]. This process is derived for each 
AC until we derive the final SPVi for each ACi. The final 
aggregation towards the root is defined with equation (8), 
which leverages the policies of Table 2 to decide whether both 
conditions of the DALVS and ALVS are satisfied to determine 
the root assurance level (the equations (9, (10 and (11 have to 
be fulfilled.), In this particular case this is CoEA(AL)=2. 
However, in case of multiple ACs it has to be also checked 
weather for each AC the minimum CAL is satisfied to fulfil a 
particular AL, as stated in Table 2 and defined by equation 
(12).  
 
 Table 4: Randomly generated SPV per individual CoE for demonstrating our 
algorithm Figure 3, via the use cases from Figure 2. Left table (a) is referring 
to the first use case scenario, Figure 2 (a), and table (b) refers to the second use 
case scenario Figure 2 (b).  
                       (a)                                                       (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To evaluate the second use case, i.e. the advanced tree 
model (see Figure 2- b), we generate for each COEi, i ∈ {A, B, C, D…N} SPVi Table 4 (b). Due to the fact that the first use 
case tree is a subset of the tree in the second use case, we can 
apply the whole process conducted in the first use case 
scenario iteratively, until we aggregate the assurance towards 
the root. Therefore, in order to avoid redundancy we will just 
refer to the process explained in the first use case and extend it 
accordingly. The traversal post order method in the second use 
case, Figure 2 .b has the following sequence {D, F, L, M, N, G, 
B, H, C, I, J, K, D, A}. Therefore we marked 5 steps in Figure 
2 b that illustrate this procedure. The first step will aggregate 
 SP4 SP3 SP2 SP1 
CoEA 0 1 1 1 
 CoEB 0 1 1 0 
CoEC 0 0 1 0 
CoED 0 0 1 1 
CoEN 1 0 1 0 
 SP4 SP3 SP2 SP1 
CoEA 0 1 1 0 
CoEB 1 0 0 0 
CoEC 1 0 1 0 
CoED 1 0 1 1 
CoEE 0 1 0 1 
CoEF 0 1 1 0 
CoEG 1 0 0 1 
CoEH 0 1 1 0 
CoEI 1 0 0 0 
CoEJ 1 0 0 0 
CoEK 1 0 1 1 
CoEL 0 1 0 0 
CoEM 0 1 1 1 
CoEN 0 1 0 1 
  
the assurance for ACSG = (COEi, i ∈ {L, M, N}) with the 
ALCP procedure which results in CoEG(AL) = [010X]. Then, 
as second step, when the Assurance level of CoEG has been 
reached we aggregate the assurance of ACSB = (COEi, i ∈ {E, 
F, G}), e.g. CoEB(AL) = [0110]. The third step determines the 
assurance level of CoEC directly according to one child node 
CoEH, CoEH(AL)=[0110]. The fourth step aggregates the 
assurance level of ACSD = (COEi, i ∈ {I, J, K}), 
CoED(AL)=[1001].  Finally the last step of the assessment 
process is to aggregate the assurance level of ToEAL = ACSA = 
(COEi, i ∈ {B, C, D}), where CoED(AL)=[0110], by fulfilling 
the equations (9, (10 and (11 leads to the overall assurance of 
AL=4. However, just as in the first use case scenario, if dealt 
with multiple assurance class we have to use equation (12 to 
derive the final consolidated AL for a particular CoE. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we present an assurance methodology for 
Cloud security properties. This will support Cloud users in 
simplifying the assessment on whether a specific security level 
(i.e. assurance level) of a service can be maintained despite 
churn in the substitute components. The method supports 
multi-tenant environments and multi-layer environments. The 
scheme has been applied to two scenarios. This theoretic 
evaluation method shows efficient application of the proposed 
assurance assessment method over the use case where we 
demonstrate how services can be assessed according to a set of 
security properties with a defined set of policies.   
Based on this work the next steps will provide a complete 
assurance class and security property catalogue that 
comprehensively covers the different aspects of Cloud 
environments. Furthermore, we are planning to use real-world 
applications from the SECCRIT and CUMULUS projects and 
benchmark them using the introduced scheme. As far as the 
model itself is concerned we will also further investigate the 
use of a binary tree model instead of the currently used general 
tree model, since we can easily transform a general tree to a 
binary tree model in order to empirically evaluate the 
performance of our algorithm. 
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